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Abstract
In this paper we aim at studying to what extent spillovers between firms may foster economic
growth. The attention is addressed to the spillovers connected with the R&D activity that
improves the quality of the goods firms supply. Our model develops a growth theory framework
and we assume that firms spread around a circle. Our study assesses that spillovers between
neighbors affect the probability of successful research for each of them. In particular, spillovers
are the forces fuelling growth when, on the whole, firms turn out to be net receivers with respect
to their neighbors.
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1 Introduction
The distribution of economic activities across spaces experiences imbalances. A few areas display
high concentrations of activities that entail the creation of economic wealth, while others are less
endowed. This unequal distribution of resources is not a typical features of one specific region, but
it is present, for instance, in the European countries as well as in the United States. The size of the
spatial dimension does not matter a lot, since such inequalities may takes place inside a same country
1 or even across countries.2 This phenomenon may have different origins. One can easily argue
that it is mainly related to the distribution of natural resources. Firms (and in general economic
activities) have a tendency to concentrate in regions exogenously endowed with natural resources, or
in proximity to natural ways of communication and so on. These reasons have been the major forces
driving the location of activities in the past during, for instance, the Industrial Revolution or, again,
it may explains why Florida attracts so many (retired) people (Ottaviano-Thisse, 2003). This way
of thinking reveal to be useless if we try to understand the rise of some concentrations less dependent
from the natural advantages,as in the case of the Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994). Without denying
the importance of the former elements, recently, economic literature has mainly addressed the
attention to the second one. The purpose is to study the phenomenon of agglomeration as the
result of human beings’ actions . Economic geography has allowed to identify conditions such that
regions attract activities, specialize production (see, for instance, the case of the Silicon Valley)
and differ between core and periphery. By a core and periphery structure we mean an unequal
distribution of activities that leads most or all of them to concentrate in a particular bounded
area (the core) and leave the other part completely or nearly empty (periphery). Within a fairly
balanced regional system, initial asymmetries are magnified by the cumulative causation and they
produce a divergent process between regions. In those models the cumulative causation between
the location of firms and workers yields self reinforcing movements explaining local specialization
and affecting regional growth and decline. In this mechanism, increasing returns play a key role
and they are mainly embodied in the fact that firms serve larger and larger markets. There are
no linkages with the scarcity of local raw materials since production factors may be imported from
somewhere else. Hence, the lack of natural resources is less crucial for the economic development
(Krugman, 1991 and Krugman et al., 1999).
The study of the linkages between local agglomerations and economic growth has been tackled
from different viewpoints. Empirical evidence helps to explain to what extent local agglomerations
support economic growth. The phenomenon of the industrial districts in Italy is the most striking
case, but there are other interesting situations as that of the industrial reconversion in Wales
1Let us think of most of the European countries where northen regions are generally the richest regions in Belgium,
Italy or Spain.
2Again European Union is an interesting case. If we focus on the per-capita level of income, northern countries
record higher level - on average- than those in the South. In 2001 the average GDP per capita in EU was 23230 euro,
ranging from 26640 euro in UK or 33200 euro in Danmark to, about, 11900 euro in Greece and Portugal (source New
Cronos Database).
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that has been planned thought the creation of local (more or less spontaneous) agglomerations
of firms (Cooke and Morgan, 1998 and OECD, 1996). Nevertheless, even if from an empirical
point of view it seems easy to verify the existence and the importance of local agglomerations as
sources of growth, the same is not so evident from a theoretical viewpoint. The crucial element
is to figure out the connection between growth and geography. Fujita and Thisse (2002) argue
that one possible approach may consider agglomeration as the territorial counterpart of economic
growth. In that sense, the process of development is similar to that of regional agglomerations.
In order to study this dynamics they propose a model of endogenous growth for an economy with
two regions. Their model relies on the combination of the building block of the Krugman’s model
core-periphery and the Grossman-Helpman-Romer’s model of endogenous growth with horizontal
differentiation. In particular, they introduce an R&D sector that uses skilled labor to produce
new varieties for the modern sector. Focusing on the steady state equilibrium, they show that
the growth of the economy is related to the spatial organization of the innovation sector across
regions. In that sense, the R&D sector appears to be a strong centripetal force since it amplifies
the circular causation of a core-periphery structure. In addition, they succeed also in proving that
the growth effect is strong enough to make the level of welfare increase even in the peripheral areas.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991a and 1991b) growth is driven by the increase in the number of
varieties. In particular, this result holds even if we concentrate on a case of local agglomerations,
such as Marshallian districts. As argued by Basevi and Ottaviano (2002), in a district, the growth
is related to the increase of the varieties of goods produced by firms. This last feature allows to
distinguish between an approach that aims at concentrating on growth for a particular bounded
space. Proximity matters and enhances the positive effects of investing in R&D. This last issue
is not new. Usually, the idea of proximity entails the existence of local spillovers and looking at
the microfoundations of local agglomeration (see Saxenian 1994), spillovers are also a centripetal
(agglomerating) force. Empirical evidence, again, supports the idea that R&D proximity favors
R&D intensity (see, for instance, Audretsch and Feldman, 1996, and Feldman and Audretsch,
1999), but, to our knowledge, none of the current researches aims at formalizing explicitly the role
of local spillovers. Some example helps to explain this assessments. In order to point out the
propensity of firms investing in R&D to cluser, an empirical study on Belgian data (Nicolini, 2002)
figures out that this tendency appears in various sectors, as Figure 1 and 2 assess.
These two pictures clearly display that the distribution of firms investing in R&D in Belgium
(in 1997) in these two sectors is far to be uniform. Some poles of concentration (or agglomeration)
appear, even if the size of such concentrations may vary across sectors and across space. This
tendency is manly explained by the idea that by clustering firms enjoy positive spillovers issuing
from the other surrounding firms. These positive effects entail a reduction of the effort that each
firm devotes to R&D activity as well as a reduction of the correspondent R&D costs each of them
has to sustain. In addition to these pecuniar advantages, exploiting positive spillovers generated
by the interaction with other firms (in the same sector, but even in other sectors whose activity is
striclty connected with that we take into consideration) increases the likelihood of the success of
R&D, i.e. R&D activity is more likely to lead to technological innovations. To quantify this effect,
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R&D distribution for sector 29 (1997)
Figure 1: Distribution of Belgian firms investing in R&D. Sector 29: Manufacture of machines and
equipment tools. (Source: Nicolini, 2002).
20 0 20 40 Kilometers
R&D distribution for sector 50 (1997)
Figure 2: Distribution of Belgian firms investing in R&D. Sector 50: Commerce of means of
transport (Source: Nicolini, 2002)
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we report some data referring to Italian digital industrial districts3 (RUR-CENSIS, 2001).
Table 1: Local firms and innovation (%) ( Source: FEDERCOMIN-RUR/CENSIS)
Industrial Districts Local areas4
Firms’propensity to innovate 51 48.6
Share of profits invested in innovation projects in 1999 8.6 9.4
The previous table support the idea that when firms cluster and collaborate among them, they
display a higher propensity to innovate and a lower financial effort.
As we stated above, the purpose of this paper is to concentrate on the formalization of the
spillover effects in a growth model, assessing to what extent local spillovers can foster growth.
To this end, we assume that knowledge produces a positive externality as in Lucas (1988). The
technological change is due to intentional investment decisions as in Romer (1990), but, as a
novelty, we add partial excludability to the positive technological externality. Spillovers will not
effect the entire economy but only the locations closer to the source of technological advancements,
i.e.the most immediate neighbors. This framework develops in the same direction as Grossman and
Helpman (1991a and 1991b), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). In
particular, we grant to them the idea of a growth model with vertical quality ladder innovation.
In this study, we assume that clustes of innovating firms are due to local externalities that makes
optimal for a firm to innovate intensely only if her neighbors do it. In this model, a final product is
obtained by using different intermediate goods. Technological innovation, for each type of a fixed
set of intermediate goods, takes the form of improvement occurring on a quality ladder. Innovations
are generated by the private maximizing behavior of competitive research firms, or research labs, of
the intermediate goods producers. For each intermediate product only the most innovative version
of the good is provided, and the firm which patents the innovation enjoys monopoly profits until
another firm develops a higher version of the good. Technology is a locally non excludable good, so
that the probability with which a firm gets a successful innovation is proportional either to amount
of research of the most immediate neighbors or to their relative innovation success.
Research intensity is on average constant across locations and innovation and growth arrive
randomly among them. The economic forces operate in a way to keep growth on average similar
across locations.
The behavior of each intermediate producer is such that the amount of research in any period
depends upon the expected future research in its own sector and that of the two most immedi-
ate neighboring sectors in the present and in future periods. The expectation of higher future
research in one of the intermediate sector discourages current research in the same sector because
3We intend as industrial district a concentration of firms belonging to a same sector of activity or other sectors
vertically linked. Usually, firms firms belonging to it usually collaborate a lot among them or all of them participate
to the development of common projects.
4By ”local areas” we mean small and rising local forms of agglomeration that cannot be considered as industrial
district yet.
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it diminishes the expected duration of monopoly profits associated with the production of the
most innovative intermediate good (the Schumpeterian creative destruction effect). Higher current
neighbors research increases current research because it increases its current productivity. The ex-
pectation of higher future neighbor research, again, discourages current research because it makes
future research more productive than the current one.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the building blocks
of the model, then in Section 3 we analyze the correspondence between spillovers and growth and,
finally Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We develop our analysis in a setting similar to that proposed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)
(granting also a lot to Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992)). Neverthe-
less we differentiate in some assumptions. Our novelty is the introduction of a measure of local
externalities between neighboring firms. In particular we intend to focus on the interaction between
local externalities and economic growth.5
The economy is organized as follows: consumers (which dispose of one unit of labor that ex-
change for units of a final good), producers of a final good and producers of intermediate inputs.
2.1 The sector of final goods
In the economy there are N final goods. A final consumption good is produced under perfect
competition, using m different intermediate inputs. These intermediate products appear in several
varieties, and continuing improvements and refinements permanently increase the quality of the
existing products. In each these sectors, the potential grades are arrayed along a quality ladder
with rungs spaced at proportional intervals. In each sector j, the innovation of a new variety of an
intermediate good replaces the old one and raises the quality qtj by a constant q > 1, so that in
sector j at the tthj innovation
qtj+1 = qqtj (1)
where q0j is the initial value of quality in sector j (taken as given). For sake of simplicity, we
normalize it so that each good j begins with q0j = 1. Subsequent improvements occur sequentially,
jumping discretely one rung at a time, at the levels q, q1, q2, and so on. If in the j sector tj
improvements have already occurred, then the available grades in this sector are 1, q, q1, q2, ... ,
qtj .
5 In this paper we assume that firms are exogenously located in the spirit of Salop (1979).
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As in current literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) the production function for each firm
i is assumed to be of a Cobb-Douglas type separable in terms of the intermediate inputs
yi = A(Li)
1−α
mX
j=1
( eXij)α with α ≤ 1,
where yi represents the amount of final good produced by firm i, Li the amount of unspecialized
labor employed by final sector firm i, eXij = Ptjt=0(qtxi,j,t) is an index of the available interme-
diate inputs from sector j weighted by a function of their quality (qt), and xi,j,t is the amount
of intermediate good j of quality qtj used in firm i. The overall input in firm i from sector j, is
therefore a quality weighted sum of the amount used of each grade. This additivity assumption
implies that quality grades within a sector are perfect substitute as inputs in production. The way
the production function is specified is such that the new quality offers an improvement in efficiency.
Therefore, since the last innovation has an efficiency advantage over the prior innovations of the
same sectors, and a disadvantage relative to the future ones, only the current best quality of each
input will be used, and the production function simplifies to
yi = A(Li)
1−α
mX
j=1
(qtjxi,j)
α. (2)
We would like to point out that (2) displays constant return to scale keeping quality fixed, while
increasing return to scale each time quality is improved.
2.2 The Intermediate producers
The producers of the m intermediate goods are assumed to be arranged on m locations along a
circle. In each locations there is a very large number of firms who compete for been the innovation
leader. We do not consider the location problem: we make the hypothesis that firms chose their
location exogenously. While several firms can be active in research each period, only the one
previously successful in innovation is allowed to produce.
The quality improvements modeled derives from the successful application of research efforts
(namely labour), at the intermediate good level, in a non deterministic way.6 Successful innovations
arrive at random times.
For each sector, the interval (tj + 1) − tj denotes the interval starting with the tthj innovation
and ending just before the (tj + 1)th. During this interval, which has a different length for each
values of tj and for each intermediate sector, the best available quality is qtj . Hence, even if there
6As it will be specified in the next section, the utility is linear in consumption and, as in Aghion and Howitt
(1992), there is no need to introduce a capital market for risk sharing.
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are potentially many firms in the same intermediate sector j, only the one that successfully created
the jth intermediate good at quality level qtj retains the monopoly rights to produce it.
Let us suppose that each intermediate good is nondurable, and it is produced with unspecialized
and specialized labor under constant return to scale, keeping quality constant. The total number of
workers (that is also the total population) is L. Each sector j hires Lj individuals supplying labor
just for the manufacturing final good, while the intermediate sector hires workers that alternatevely
for manufacturing of the intermediate product j or in research. For each period and in each
intermediate sector, it holds that
lj = l
x
j + l
R&D
j .
Definition 1 The technology of the production of each intermediate good takes a linear form.
Hence, given that xj represents both the number of unit produced and the amount of skilled
labor allocated to manufacturing in sector j,we simplify the previous expression as follows
lj = xj + nj , (3)
where nj denotes the amount of skilled labor allocated to R&D in sector j.7
2.3 Research and Development
The R&D success is random, so that progress occurs unevenly in the same sector and across sectors.
We consider the number of persons hired in R&D, nj,tj , as the flow of resources used in R&D by
all the potential innovators in sector j and the highest quality ladder reached in each sector j is tj ,
with j = 0, 1, 2, ...,m− 1.8
Definition 2 Innovations in the sector j arrive randomly with the following arrival rate
δj,tj=λ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1 ,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1)nj,tj , with qtj−1 , qtj , qtj+1 > 1. (4)
The probability of success in research results to be proportional to the amount of research
in sector j, but also to some local characteristics. In this study, we consider the amount of the
research effort of the two most immediate neighbor locations (henceforth neighbors) and a factor
representing their technological progress with respect to the one in sector j. Let us define the term
λ(·), representing the productivity of the research technology in sector j, as an increasing function
of both the amount of research conducted by the two most immediate neighboring sectors j − 1
and j + 1, and their relative technological progress. Hence,
7For sake of semplicity, we do not account for a diversification in the qualification of the labor force (between
manufacturing and reseach) that usually leads to a differentation of wages.
8 Indirectly, this hypothesis refers to another one that will define later: the level of wages is normalized to one.
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∂λ(·)
∂nj−1,tj−1
> 0, ∂λ(·)
∂nj+1,tj+1
> 0, ∂λ(·)
∂
qtj−1
qtj
> 0, ∂λ(·)
∂
qtj+1
qtj
> 0.
This assumption embeds the idea of local positive spillovers that innovation exerts on neighbors.
Being close to technologically advanced firms investing in R&D makes every unit spent in R&D
more productive.
A priori we cannot understand if this positive externality generates an increase in the R&D
in sector j, because of the increased productivity of research resources. Empirical literature seems
confirming the tendency of innovating firms to cluster in order to exploit such positive externalities.
Indeed the strength of local spillovers principally relies on physical proximity (see Audretsch and
Feldman, 1996 as well as Feldman and Audretsch 1999). However, in this setting, the firm that
succeeds in innovating monopolizes the intermediate sector, making previous period innovation
obsolete.
2.4 Monopoly Price, Quantity and Profits
Taking into account the hypothesis of free entry into the R&D, each potential intermediate producer
j has to find the optimal amount of labor resources to allocate to research. Each sector j is in
equilibrium when the cost of making research equals the expected benefits. The cost of the research,
per unit of time, is the flow of resources invested in R&D by the potential innovators in sector j.
When the highest quality-ladder achieved in that sector is tj , this cost is given by wj,tjnj,tj .
Definition 3 Given the innovation flows, in each sector, only the highest quality good is produced
and the producer enjoys a monopolist power.
The benefit of the research occurs only when success arrives. This benefit is given by a stream
of monopoly profits to the producer of the highest quality. The duration of this monopoly power
is uncertain; it lasts until a competitor breaks through the next improvement. Not all the research
is successful, therefore these expected returns arrive with the probability (4). In order to solve
this problem, as in Barro- Sala-i-Martin (1995), we assume that the potential innovator cares only
about the expected present value of the stream of profits, and not about the randomness of the
returns of her research. We begin with computing the price, quantity and profit for the monopolist
of the intermediate sector j. The producer of the intermediate good xj,tj using the tj innovation
(either discovered in her own lab or after purchasing the patent from another one) maximizes her
profits from the sales of this intermediate good to all the final producers i. For sake of simplicity,
we normalize the level of wages to one.
Since the final good yi is produced under perfect competition, the price of the intermediate
good that enters as input into the production function of yi has to equalize the marginal product,
which in our specification of Cobb Douglas production function becomes
pi,j,tj (xi,j,tj ) =
∂yi
∂xi,j,tj
= AL1−αi αq
α
tjx
α−1
i,j,tj
, (5)
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Knowing that only the highest quality of each good is purchased, by aggregating the profit
maximizing conditions over all final good producers we get the demand function for good xj,tj
xj,tj = L
·
Aαqtj
pj,tj
¸ 1
1−α
. (6)
Replacing (5) and (6) into the profits of the leading hedge producer j, the interior solution for
xj,tj > 0 of the first order conditions (second order always satisfied) yields the monopoly price
pj,t =
1
α
. (7)
Plugging (5) into (6), the aggregate quantity produced of the jth intermediate good of leading edge
quality becomes
xj,tj = L
h
Aα2qαtj
i 1
1−α
, (8)
implying that an evolution of tj over time in each sector and its divergence across sectors leads
to variations of the quality over time and across sectors. Combining (5) with (6) and taking into
account the costs of production, the profits for a temporal monopolist turns out to be:
πj,tj =
µ
1− α
α
¶
xj,tj =
µ
1− α
α
¶
L
h
Aα2qαtj
i 1
1−α
. (9)
2.5 The expected value of the research
The leader in sector j, producing the intermediate good at quality qtj , enjoys monopoly profits
from the time she made the discovery τ tj until the time a competitor will come up with the next
innovation qtj+1 at time τ tj+1. Let Γj,tj denote the time interval over which tj retains the leadership
Γj,tj = τ tj+1 − τ tj .
Let us call Vj,tj the present value of this stream of profits. Assuming r constant
Vj,tj =
Z Γj,tj
0
πj,tje
−rsds.
Over the period Γj,tj the profits are constant: both qtj and wj,tj do not vary. So the solution for
the benefit from the tj innovation entails that this benefit increases with the amount of profit and
their duration
Vj,tj =
πj,tj (1− e
−rΓj,tj )
r
. (10)
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However, the duration Γj,tj is a random variable, so that the value of interest for the intermediate
producer is actually the expected benefit E(Vj,tj ). In order to determine this value, we need to
fix the probability per unit of time that innovation occurs at a point in time τ . Let us define this
probability g(τ). This density function can be found by computing the derivative of the cumulative
probability density function G(τ) for Γj,tj . Then, G(τ) describes the probability that Γj,tj ≤ τ .
The probability per unit of time that innovation occurs at τ is equal to the probability of one
occurring per unit of time δj,tj (equation (4)) conditional on a discovery not having happened so
far [1−G(τ)]
g(τ) =
dG(τ)
dτ
= [1−G(τ)] δj,tj . (11)
Throughout Γj,tj , nj,tj the number of workers in R&D is constant, but we are not able to argue the
same for all the components of (4). Innovations takes place at different times in different sectors,
making R&D workforce react as well. If a steady state exists, then the optimal research intensity
needs to be constant at the optimal level, and the technological difference between sectors would,
on average, be constant as well. In the next section we prove that an equilibrium exists, so that
we can treat the independent variables in (4) as constant (on average) during Γj,tj . Therefore, for
the Jensen’s Inequality, the solution that we obtain when evaluating δj,tj as a constant, and not
constant on average, is a limit solution instead of an exact solution. Therefore, by considering δj,tj
as a constant, we solve the differential equation.
.
G(τ) + pj,tjG(τ) = δj,tj ,
and we define a solution for the density function
G(τ) = 1− e−δj,tj τ ,
such that
g(τ) =
.
G(τ) = δj,tje
−δj,tj τ .
This last result allow to compute the expected benefit of the research
E(Vj,tj ) = E
Ã
πj,tj (1− e
−rΓj,tj )
r
!
=
Z ∞
0
πj,tj (1− e−rτ )
r
δj,tje
−pj,tj τdτ (12)
=
πj,tj
r + δj,tj
.
Plugging (9) into (12) one gets the full expression for the expected value of successful research.
Anyway, a few comments may be drawn on (12). The denominator of this expression displays the
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obsolescence adjusted interest rate, namely r + δj,tj , where the term δj,tj represents the effect of
creative destruction. When the amount of research conducted by the neighbors and their relative
technological advancements is constant, a high level of research in sector j diminishes the expected
payoffs from innovation in sector j. Generally, a highly innovative sector displays higher probability
of obsolescence too. This mechanism leads the monopoly profit to be enjoyed for a shorter period
of time. Similarly, considering the level of research in sector j as a constant, high contemporaneous
level of research of neighbors increases the probability of successful research in sector j. As before,
this process shortens the length of the monopoly profit for the incumbent producer in sector j,
and, as a consequence of that, decreases the expected value of the research, namely the payoff from
innovation.
2.6 The determination of the R&D effort
Now, we need to figure out more precisely the trade-off between costs and benefits in doing R&D. As
we explained above, the uncertainty related to the R&D outcomes is proportional to the probability
that an innovation occurs. We already know that it arrives randomly at the already mentioned
rate δj,tj .
In order to be the monopolist of invention tj+1, the cost of research has to be advanced during
innovation period tj , while the benefits, if ever, are going to be enjoyed during invention period
tj + 1.
The costs of research per unit of time during the invention period tj are simply the amount of
money paid to the employees in the research sector. Taking into account the nomalization of wages
they are equal to nj,tj . Similarly, the benefits of an innovations may be defined as the product
between the probability δj,tj per unit of time of success, and with it the enjoyment of E(Vj,tj )
during invention period tj + 1 (i.e. δj,tjE(Vj,tj+1)).
In equilibrium, with nj,tj ≥ 0, for each potential innovator the cost of an additional unit of
research should be equalized to the benefit δj,tjE(Vj,tj+1), i.e. the value of becoming the tj + 1
monopolist multiplied by the probability of success in innovating of an extra research unit
λ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1 ,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1)E(Vj,tj+1) ≤ 1, nj,tj ≥ 0. (13)
High levels of contemporaneous research in more advanced neighborhood j − 1 and j +1 increases
the productivity of research, i.e. the probability of success, in sector j. This change determines an
increase in the value of research, which leads to higher level of research in sector j.
Replacing (4) and (12) into (13), the equilibrium condition becomes
1
λ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1 ,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1)
≥
πj,tj+1
r + λ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1 ,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1)nj,tj+1
,
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with at least one equality holding. Neighbors’ current research decreases the cost of current re-
search. As it has been argued, the positive spillovers are due to the increase in productivity of
one sector’s research once neighbors are researching intensively. Neighbors future research, instead,
decreases the benefit for the sector current research. The cause of this negative effect is that an
expected increase in productivity of research increases one’s sector current research obsolete rate,
and shortening the period for which monopolistic profit could be enjoyed it decreases the expected
benefit of research.
Manipulating the previous condition by replacing the profit function at period invention tj + 1
yields to
r + λ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1+1,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1+1)nj,tj+1 = λ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1 ,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1)
¡
1−α
α
¢
L
h
Aα2qαtj+1
i 1
1−α
,
and applying (1) we get
1
qαtj
=
λ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1 ,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1)
¡
1−α
α
¢
α
2
1−αLA
1
1−α qα
h
qαtj+1
i −α
1−α
r + λ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1+1,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1+1)nj,tj+1
. (14)
At each point in time, the labor market condition has to hold, so that
lj − nj,tj = L
¡
Aα2
¢ 1
1−α
h
qαtj
i α
1−α
or, put differently,
1
qαtj
= L(1−α)Aα2
¡
lj − nj,tj
¢−(1−α)
. (15)
Since the amount of research will ultimately depend on neighbors’ research and technological
progress, the wage will vary depending on location too.
In the next section we move directly to the results, while technical details to get them are
presented in the Appendix.
3 Spillover effects and growth
At the steady state, the values of (nj,tj , qtj ), correspond to (knowing that q = 1),
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nj =
(1− α)
2α− 1

lj −
Ã
r¡
1−α
α
¢
Q
! 1
1−c−d

 , (16)
qtj =



L(1−α)Aα2

lj −
(1− α)
2α− 1

lj −
Ã
r¡
1−α
α
¢
Q
! 1
1−c−d




−(1−α)



1
α
. (17)
In particular, recalling that Q ≡ qtj+1qtj
qtj+1
qtj
in any period, we may draw some interesting consid-
erations. For any value of Q > 0, at time t, a positive variation of it implies that the quality of the
neighbors betters with respect to that of tj .9 Given the value of all other parameters, an increase of
the value of Q entails an increase of the number of qualified workers working in R&D in sector tj ,10
that according to (17) yields to an improvement of the level of quality qtj . The change in qtj is due
to the positive spillover effects that sector tj receives from (tj−1) and (tj+1) and its own expenses
in R&D that make an innovation in tj more likely to happen. In addition, if we concentrate on
the size of the sector we take into account (i.e the size of the parameter lj),we deduce that an
increase of lj entails an increase of the number of workers devoted to R&D (nj). Nevertheless, for
low values of α(in particular for α ≤ 2/3) the increase of the number of qualified workers is lower
than the increase of number of workers lj and quality qtjwill definitely records positive variations.
In case α ≥ 2/3, the variation of qtj with respect to an increase of lj is uncertain.
Conclusion 4 A big size of local spillovers entails an increase of the number of workers in the
R&D sector as well as the level of the highest quality available in sector j. Similarly, a big size of
the sector j (via the parameter lj) yields to a high number of workers involved in R&D and for low
values of α the level of quality will be definitely better.
In this model, the solution of the dynamics system allow to argue that, the main forces driving
changes in the setting are spillovers. In particular, we are interested in determining to what extent
spillovers may drive economic growth. In order to state this effect, we need to define the expression
for the aggregate output and the total quantity of intermediaries produced as function of local
spillovers. By aggregating (8) across sectors, we get :
9 In case of negative variation of Q, namely, the quality qtj betters in comparison to that of its neigbors, the result
we get are symmetrically the opposite, because the neigbours try to fill the existing gap and this makes sector tj
loose its leading position.
10Firms in tj realises that they have to invest more in R&D for reducing the gap if they aim at achieveng a
monipolistic power.
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X = A1/(1−α)α
2
1−αL
NX
j=1
(qtj )
α
1−α (18)
= A1/(1−α)α
2
1−αLQ
Plugging (8) into (2) and aggregating over the firms i, we obtain the expression for the aggregate
output:
Y = A1/(1−α)α
2α
1−αL
NX
j=1
(qtj )
α
1−α . (19)
At the steady state, it holds that for any firm i, qtj is equal to (17), so that the quantity
relies on the value of the spillover parameter Q. Indeed both Y and X rely on the index Q =
NP
j=1
(qtj )
α
1−α . At the equilibrium, by some algebraic manipulation of (8), it is easily to fix that
(qtj )
α
1−α = LA1/(1−α)α
2
1−α (xj),where xj = (lj − nj).
Local spillovers may be a source of growth, but, since they can be positive or negative according
to the size of
¡
qtj+1 , qtj , qtj+1
¢
, we need to pay attention for this detail when defining the growth
conditions. In particular, we concentrate on the case when α = 2/3 and c = d = 0. Under those
hypothesis, according to (16) and (17), it is possible to state that :11
γY = γX = −γQ.
Under those hypothesis, nj reduces such that :
xj =
2r
Q
.
Hence, both Y and X are constant multiples of Q.12 In order to quantify how spillovers affect
growth, we need to define the rate of growth at the steady state. By applying logarithm and
derivatives to Q, and exploiting (1), we obtain that, at the steady state :
11 If we took into account that c+ d < 1, we would get γx = − 11−c−dγQ,i.e. the relationship between the two rates
of growth would be magnified by a positive constant.
12We remind that the interest rate r is taken as constant. Moreover, at the steady state, the difference of qualities
between sectors are constant, so the aggregate index is the product between the number of sectors (less two) and the
costant level of spillovers for each couple.
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γQ =
·
1
qtj+1
+
1
qtj−1
− 2
qtj
¸
. (20)
Looking at expression (20), we may easily state that in case any sector tj is a net receiver of
spillovers from its two neighbors,13 its quality improves and γQ < 0. Now, assuming that the level
of quality for each sector at time t is greater than one, by computing the rate of growth of x (via
expression 3), we obtain that γx is positive for γQ < 0. Hence, once a sector benefits from positive
spillovers, γx is expected to be positive as well as γY (according to equation (2)).On the contrary,
whenever γQ > 0, any sector tj is a net source of spillovers, and both γQ and γX will suffer from
it.
Conclusion 5 At the steady state, for α = 2/3, when each sector enjoys positive spillovers from
his neigbours, the rate of growth of the system is positive too.
3.1 Households spending and welfare analysis
Up to now, we did not explicitly mention a particular form of utility function of consumers. Indeed,
we implicity consider that in this closed economy all the total quantity of final good (Y ) is consumed
by the all the population (L). In order to be more precise, as in Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995), we
assume a constant intertemporal elasticity function (CIES). We consider that households maximize
the utility function
U =
Z ∞
0
µ
c1−θ − 1
1− θ
¶
e−ρtdt, (21)
where c represents consumption, ρ is the rate of intertemporal preference and the elasticity of
the marginal utility is (-θ). Household aggregate income is the sum of wages on the fixed aggregate
quantity of labor and interest on the total assets (market values of all the firms). Household
optimization gives the standard condition for consumption growth rate
γc =
1
θ
(r − ρ). (22)
In order to compute the steady state conditions, in the model, we assumed that the interest
rate is given as constant. We proceed to check this hypothesis, once we have computed the rate of
growth. Knowing that, in our setting, Y = C, at the steady state, we may derive that γc = γQ. By
comparing (20) with (22), we get that
13This conclusion is involved by the assumption that tj , tj−1, and tj+1 represent the latest quality rung in sector
j, j − 1, and j − 1 respectively, at the same point in time they are all different. Or, put differently, the same quality
steps are reached by the sectors at different points in time.
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r = θ
·
1
qtj+1
+
1
qtj+1
− 2
qtj
¸
,
that is constant for the given values of the parameter (qtj , qtj+1 , qtj+1) at the equilibrium.
In particular, knowing that Y is the real output (namely the flow of consumption goods) in
the economy, we aim at assessing some considerations considering the level of welfare when local
spillovers are present.
At the steady state, we begin with taking into account equation (16). From that equation is
easly to compute that :
xj =
3α− 2
2α− 1 lj +
1− α
2α− 1
"
r
1−α
α
Q
# 1
1−c−d
. (23)
Knowing that expession, via (qtj )
α
1−α = LA1/(1−α)α
2
1−α (xj),we comupte the value of (qtj ).
Plugging it into (19) and aggregating across sectors, we obtain the following expression:
Y = A2/(1−α)α
2(α+1)
1−α L

3α− 2
2α− 1(Nlj) +
1− α
2α− 1
"
Nr
1−α
α
NQ
# 1
1−c−d

 . (24)
Looking at (24), we realize that positive variations of Y correspond to negative variations of Q.
Thinking of Y as the flow of the consumption goods, its values will be high as far as the level of Q
is small. Put differently, in economic terms, we may assess that the level of welfare of the system
increases when the disparities across sectors are small, namely when the size of the spillovers is not
too big.
Conclusion 6 Consumers enjoy better low levels of spillovers .
At this point, a clear trade off on the nature and effects of local spillover appears. On one
hand, positive spillovers allow to better the local quality of goods. On the other hand, a high level
of positive spillovers entail high discrepancies across intermediate sectors that produce a reduction
of the level of welfare of the local population (intended as the flow of consumption at the steady
state). Therefore, supporting policies that incite collaborations among firms such to reduce the
quality gap among them is definitely welcome in order to improve the economic welfare of the
system. Nevertheless, reducing such a gap implies also smoothing the magnitude of the rate of
growth at the equilibrium.
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4 Conclusions
In this study we assess the role of local spillovers as engine of economic growth. We formalize the
existence of positive spillovers between neighbors by assuming that sectors (and firms) settle around
a circle. Each of them interacts with the two sectors next to it. In particular, as in other growth
models, positive spillovers concern the R&D activity and the likelihood to create an innovation
when locating next to other firms that invest in R&D.
Nevertheless, spillovers may have a double effects. On one hand, considering the level of research
of a sector as a constant, a high level of research of neighbors increases the probability of successful
research but also the osbsolescence rate. On the other hand, neighbor future research decreases the
benefits for the current research of a given sector. Moving to the analysis of spillovers, spillover
growth rate drives the growth rate of the economy for fixed values of the parameters. Under
those hypothesis we are able to assert that when sectors (as a whole) are net receivers of spillovers
(namely, we are in a situation of positive spillovers) spillovers drive the economic growth. The
opposite happens when, on the whole, sectors are net suppliers of spillovers.
In that sense, if we would extend these results to a wider context to provide suggestions in
political matters, it could be reasonable to think that policy agents can profitable sustain the
creation of agglomerations (or networks) as a way of fostering local growth under the conditions of
preventing the creation of leading positions among firms belonging to the agglomeration. Hence,
policies that sustain a sharing knowledge process across the members of a group are useful to
guarantee the active role of local agglomerations in economic systems. However, focusing on the
welfare analysis, we may also add that high discrepancies among the quality of goods supplied
by firms entail also a negative effect on the local welfare, since a high level of spillovers yields
proportionally to a low level of consumption.
More developments in this direction should deserve attention. In particular, an analysis on the
effect of the welfare could be useful to understand to what extent local agglomerations can help
the local development. In addition, another possible extensions could involve the fomalization of
spillover effects in an economic setting involving (explicitly) the creation of local agglomerations,
where the location of firms is not exogenously given.
References
[1] Aghion, P. and Howitt, P., 1992, “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction”, Econo-
metrica, vol. 60(2), pp.323-351.
[2] Audretsch, D.B. and Feldman, M. (1996): “R&D Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation
and Production”, American Economic Review, vol.86839, pp.630-640.
[3] Barro, R. and Sala-I-Martin, X., 1995, Economic Growth, McGraw-Hill.
18
[4] Basevi, G. and Ottaviano G.I.P., 2002, “The district and the global economy: exportation
versus foreign location”, Journal of Regional Science, vol. 42(1), pp. 107-126.
[5] Cooke, Ph. and Morgan, K., 1998: ‘The Associational Economy ’, Oxford University Press.
[6] Feldman, M and Audretsch, D.B., 1999: “Innovation in cities: Science-based diversity, spe-
cialization and localized competition”, European Economic Review, vol.43, pp. 409-429.
[7] Fujita M., Krugman P., and Venables, 1999: “The Spatial Economy : Cities, Regions, and
International Trade”, MIT Press.
[8] Fujita M. and Thisse, J.F., 2002, “Economics of Agglomerations”, Cambridge University Press.
[9] Grossman, G. and Helpman, E, 1991a, “Quality Ladders and Product Cycles”, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol.106(2), pp. 557-586.
[10] Grossman, G. and Helpman, E.,1991b, “Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy”,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
[11] Lucas, R.,1988, “On the mechanism of economic development”, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, vol.22, pp. 3-22.
[12] Krugman, P.,1991: “Geography and Trade”, MIT Press.
[13] Nicolini, R., 2002: “R&D et développement régional en Belgique: quelques perspectives’, in
Services Fédéraux des affaires scientifiques, techniques et culturelles. Rapport belge en matière
de science, technologie et innovation, 2001, pag. 145-171, Bruxelles, Belgique,
[14] OECD,1996: ‘Network of Enterprises and Local Development - Competing and Co-operating
in Local Productive Systems’, Local Economic and Employment Development Series
[15] Ottaviano, G. I. P. and Thisse, J.F., 2003: “Agglomeration and economic geography”, CORE
Discussion Paper n. 2003-16.
[16] Romer, P.M., 1990: “Endogenous Technological Change”, Journal of Political Economy,
vol.98(5), part II, pp. S71-S102.
[17] RUR-CENSIS, 2001, “ Rapporto FEDERCOMIN. I Distretti Produttivi Digitali”.
[18] Saxenian, A.,1994: “Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route
128”, Harvard University Press.
[19] Salop, S., 1979: “Monopolistic competition with outside goods”, Econometrica, vol.10(1), pp.
141-156.
19
A Appendix
Before describing mathematical computations, it is important to remind that tj is not a particular
instant in time, but the latest quality step in sector j, so that for different sectors the tj , tj−1,
tj+1 will signify different numbers. Combining (14) and (15), we get
L(1−α)Aα2 (lj − nj,t)−(1−α) =
=
λ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1 ,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1)
¡
1−α
α
¢
α
2
1−αLA
1
1−α qα
h
L(1−α)Aα2
¡
lj − nj,tj+1
¢−(1−α)i −α1−α
r + λ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1+1,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1+1)nj,tj+1
,
that can be reduced to
1¡
lj − nj,tj
¢(1−α) = λ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1 ,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1)
¡
1−α
α
¢
qα
¡
lj − nj,tj+1
¢α
r + λ(q
tj−1+1
qtj+1
, nj−1,tj−1+1,
qtj+1+1
qtj+1
, nj+1,tj+1+1)nj,tj+1
. (25)
Again, an anticipated increase in the research efforts in one sector discourages current research
(creative destruction effect), shortening the expected lifetime of innovation monopoly.
Let us define φ ≡
¡
1−α
α
¢
qα, (25) becomes
r + λ(
qtj−1+1
qtj+1
, nj−1,tj−1+1,
qtj+1+1
qtj+1
, nj+1,tj+1+1)nj,tj+1 =
= φλ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1 ,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1) (lj − nj,t+1)
α (lj − nj,t)(1−α) .
Let us remind that tj , tj−1, and tj+1 represent the latest quality rung in sector j, j − 1, and
j − 1 respectively, at the same point in time they are all different, i.e. the same quality steps are
reached by the sectors at different point in time.
In addition, we select a specific form for the expression (4) such that
λ(
qtj−1
qtj
, nj−1,tj−1 ,
qtj+1
qtj
, nj+1,tj+1) ≡
µ
qtj−1
qtj
qtj+1
qtj
¶
ϑ(nj−1,tj−1 , nj+1,tj+1),
and
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λ(
qtj−1+1
qtj+1
, nj−1,tj−1+1,
qtj+1+1
qtj+1
, nj+1,tj+1+1) ≡
µ
qtj−1+1
qtj+1
qtj+1+1
qtj+1
¶
ϑ(nj−1,tj−1+1, nj+1,tj+1+1).
Since what it is really important for sector j is t, we also define ϑ(τ) ≡ ϑ(nj−1,tj−1 , nj+1,tj+1),
and ϑ(τ + 1) ≡ ϑ(nj−1,tj−1+1, nj+1,tj+1+1), since we are interested in determining to what extent
the amount of contemporaneous neighbors’ research is really important for sector j . Hence, the
equilibrium condition becomes
¡
lj − nj,tj
¢
=


r +
³
qtj−1+1
qtj+1
qtj+1+1
qtj+1
´
ϑ(τ + 1)nj,tj+1
φ
³
qtj−1
qtj
qtj+1
qtj
´
ϑ(τ)
¡
lj − nj,tj+1
¢α


1
(1−α)
,
whose dynamics we study after having introduce this substitution xt =
¡
lj − nj,tj
¢
xt =


r +
³
qtj−1+1
qtj+1
qtj+1+1
qtj+1
´
ϑ(τ + 1)(lj − xt+1)
φ
³
qtj−1
qtj
qtj+1
qtj
´
ϑ(τ)xαt+1


1
(1−α)
.
It can be easily checked that when neighbors research intensity does not vary, ϑ(τ) = ϑ(τ +1),
sector j research intensity present a unique crossing with the steady state line in the set of existence
of the function.
We can conclude that a steady state exists for which xt = xt+1. This implies that for all sectors j,
j = 0, 1, 2...m−1, it holds that nj,tj = nj,tj+1 = nj , which implies ϑ(τ) = ϑ(τ +1) = ϑ(nj−1, nj+1),
while qtj , qtj−1 ... at each point in time are considered exogenously given in each sector.
The steady state equation becomes
r +
µ
qtj−1+1
qtj+1
qtj+1+1
qtj+1
¶
ϑ(nj−1, nj+1)nj = φ
µ
qtj−1
qtj
qtj+1
qtj
¶
ϑ(nj−1, nj+1) (lj − nj) .
We define Q ≡
qtj−1
qtj
qtj+1
qtj
, and via expression (1) we deduce even that Q =
qtj−1+1
qtj+1
qtj+1+1
qtj+1
, and
we get
nj =
φljϑ(nj−1, nj+1)− rQ−1
(1 + φ)ϑ(nj−1, nj+1)
.
In order to find a finite solution for nj , nj−1, and nj+1 we need to specify the function
ϑ(nj−1, nj+1) and solve for the difference equation
ϑ(nj−1, nj+1)
·
lj −
(1− φ)
φ
nj
¸
=
r
φ
Q−1
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The solution method requires a linearization of the expression, so we can assume a the following
(convenient) functional form for ϑ(·).
ϑ(nj−1, nj+1) =
·
lj−1 −
(1− φ)
φ
nj−1
¸−d ·
lj+1 −
(1− φ)
φ
nj+1
¸−c
,
with c, d ≥ 0 such to satisfy the assumption that an increase in neighbors research intensity
generate a positive technological spillover. Taking logs and defining zj ≡ log
h
lj − (1−φ)φ nj
i
and
ξ ≡ log
³
r
φ
Q−1
´
, the second order difference equation becomes:
−czj+2 + zj+1 − dzj = ξ.
The particular integral is
zp =
ξ
1− c− d,
and since ξ is positive, in order to zp to be positive we need to impose c+ d < 1.
The characteristic equation presents the roots: b1,2 = 12c ± 12c
√
1− 4cd. In order to have two
distinct real roots, c and d have to satisfy 1− 4cd ≥ 0 or cd ≤ 14 . Since the previous restriction was
c+ d < 1, this second condition will be always satisfied, and the general solution becomes
zj =
ξ
1− c− d +A1
µ
1
2c
− 1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¶j
+A2
µ
1
2c
+
1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¶j
.
Imposing the initial condition z0 =
ξ
1−c−d +A1
¡
1
2c −
1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¢0
+A2
¡
1
2c +
1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¢0
we
find
A1 = z0 −
ξ
1− c− d −A2.
Imposing periodicity (i.e. if we have m sectors arrayed along a circle it must be that the first
one coincides with the one after the last one, so if z0 is the first one zm−1 is the last one, and the
condition becomes z0 = zm)
ξ
1− c− d +A1 +A2 =
ξ
1− c− d +A1
µ
1
2c
− 1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¶m
+A2
µ
1
2c
+
1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¶m
,
and from this, after substituting the previously found A1, we obtain
A1 =
µ
z0 −
ξ
1− c− d
¶" −1 + ¡ 12c + 12c√1− 4cd¢m¡
1
2c +
1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¢m − ¡ 12c − 12c√1− 4cd¢m
#
,
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and
A2 =
µ
z0 −
ξ
1− c− d
¶"
1−
¡
1
2c −
1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¢m¡
1
2c +
1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¢m − ¡ 12c − 12c√1− 4cd¢m
#
,
so that the solution becomes
zj =
ξ
1− c− d +
µ
z0 −
ξ
1− c− d
¶" −1 + ¡ 12c + 12c√1− 4cd¢m¡
1
2c +
1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¢m − ¡ 12c − 12c√1− 4cd¢m
#
·
·
µ
1
2c
− 1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¶j
+
µ
z0 −
ξ
1− c− d
¶
·
·
"
1−
¡
1
2c −
1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¢m¡
1
2c +
1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¢m − ¡ 12c − 12c√1− 4cd¢m
#µ
1
2c
+
1
2c
√
1− 4cd
¶j
.
Solving for zm, we obtain zm =
ξ
1−c−d , so that it must be true that z0 =
ξ
1−c−d , which implies
for our solution that
zj =
ξ
1− c− d ∀j = 0, 1, 2, ...,m− 1.
Recalling zj ≡ log
h
lj − (1−φ)φ nj
i
and ξ ≡ log
³
r
φ
Q−1
´
, the solution for the optimal value of
research intensity is
nj =
φ
(1− φ)
"
lj −
µ
r
φ
Q−1
¶ 1
1−c−d
#
,
and since φ ≡
¡
1−α
α
¢
qα, the solution becomes:
nj =
(1− α)qα
α− (1− α)qα

lj −
Ã
r¡
1−α
α
¢
qαQ
! 1
1−c−d

 ,
qtj =



L(1−α)Aα2

lj −
(1− α)qα
α− (1− α)qα

lj −
Ã
r¡
1−α
α
¢
qαQ
! 1
1−c−d




−(1−α)



1
α
.
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